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Abstract. Trusted Computing and Trustmarks are two approaches developed to enhance 
internet security and trust and we claim that they are structurally similar and an exercise in 
mutual learning would be of great benefit for both. We argue that TC philosophy could possibly 
supplement TMOs so that TMs become to TMOs more than just a mere link while we address 
critical questions regarding reliance liability. With our present study we propose that the model 
for adequate TMO liability could possibly be an example of how to deal with the issue of TC’s 
reliance liability.                       
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper argues that Trusted Computing (TC) and Trustmarks (TM) share more than a highly polysemantic 
word in their names, and that while the respective communities interested in the development and legal 
regulation of these two approaches to internet security, have in the past seldom attempted to systematically 
exchange concepts and ideas. Such an exercise in mutual learning is of great potential benefit. In particular, we 
argue that the more mature debate on the legal implications of TMs is of high relevance for the development and 
regulation of trusted computing, while conversely the technologically more ambitious TC approach can provide 
important insights into the user requirements for the next generation of TMs.  
 
As more and more of our activities are carried out online, it has become increasingly clear over the past 
decades that the Internet, which was never intended for this type and scale of commercial activity, is vulnerable 
to attacks and criminal activities. Given the widespread acceptance of the commercialization of the Internet, e-
commerce has experienced astonishing growth since its development in the 1990’s. Security and privacy – 
amongst other issues1 – seem to be at the top of consumer’s concerns while conducting onli1ne transactions. As 
recent statistics show, e-consumers do not feel secure at all in the online environment and this has an impact on 
their willingness to provide personal or payment details over the Internet2.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 CHEN CHENG-HAO & MASOUD SAEEDI, Building a Trust Model in the Online Market Place, 5 Journal of Internet Commerce 
(2006);ASSAFA ENDESHAW, The Legal Significance of Trustmarks, 10 Information & Communications Technology Law 
(2001). 
2
 Scoping Study for the Measurement of Trust in the Online Environment. No. 
DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2005)1/FINAL(2005);Measuring Security and Trust in the Online Environment: A View Using Official 
Data. No. DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2007)4/FINAL(2008). 
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We can, broadly speaking, distinguish two risk scenarios: In the first, a consumer gives financial or personal 
details to a fraudulent website that then abuses the information. In the second, the consumer gives his details to a 
legitimate e-commerce provider, whose site is then however attacked and compromised by a third party, which 
steals the information. In the second type of scenario, legitimate users too can become unwittingly helpers of 
criminal activity when letting their computer become compromised – possibly through a transaction on a 
fraudulent website as in scenario 1.  
 
To reap the benefits of the ICT revolution, users must be able to trust their system. When asked to pay for 
goods bought online, to make a bank transfer from an online account, or to apply for a passport at a government 
run website, it is essential that the user can trust the communication to be secure, and that the party he is 
communicating with, is the party it claims to be.  
 
This paper uses the notion from the field of trusted systems, according to Shirey’s internet security glossary3 
and not the sociological concept4. It is used in this latter way in many papers that address similar contexts as 
ours5 and benefits from the high level of abstractness that allows it to be applied to both humans and machines. 
Thus, Trusted systems are systems that can be relied upon to perform certain security policies in an expected 
manner and in the sense of behavioral consistency: TC “refers to a computer system for which an entity has 
some level of assurance that (part or all of) the computer system is behaving as expected”6 for a particular 
purpose. The outcome ultimately would be to allow the user to ‘blindly trust’ his computer again, without a 
constant need for self-monitoring. 
 
This paper aims to show that the similarities between TC and TM are so strong that we can transfer ideas and 
experiences between these two fields. In particular TC can learn from the discussion of legal problems with TM, 
including in-build arbitration, while TM can benefit from the TC experience with remote attestation. 
2. Trustmarks in a nutshell 
Fortunately, the European Union has trust in e-commerce amongst the top places in its digital agenda7. The 
European Commission created a dedicated agency8 exclusively for achieving high and effective level of network 
and information security. According to the agenda, the EU takes coordinated measures on network and 
information security in order to increase trust and confidence in cyberspace.  
 
In an effort to attract and keep consumers, e-businesses seek ways to enhance consumer trust on the Internet 
to allow this “new way of transferring ownership or right to use good or services through trustmarks. 
 
Trustmarks (TMs) have been developed in the late 1990s as an attempt to develop and gain consumer trust 
through web signals. The Trustmark Organisations (TMOs) which are in fact Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), are 
independent parties that provide TMs to online merchants (e-merchants), as a way to label that a product, process 
or service that the e-merchant offers conforms to specific quality characteristics concerning legitimacy, security  
 
 
                                                          
3
 R. SHIREY, RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary   (RFC Editor. 2000). 
4
 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (Simon & Schuster Free Press Paperbacks 
book 1st ed. 1995). 
5
 BORIS BALACHEFF, et al., Computing Platform Security in Cyberspace, 5 Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep. (2000);CHRIS J. MITCHELL, 
What is Trusted Computing?, in Trusted Computing (Chris J. Mitchell ed. 2008). 
6
 MITCHELL.   
7
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2011/C 54/17 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 'Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions - A Digital Agenda for Europe' COM(2010) 245 final  § 54 (Office for Official Publication of the 
EEC ed., Luxembourg, Office for Official Publication of the EEC  2011). 
8
 Information security awareness initiatives: Current practice and the measurement of success. pt. 24 (2007). 
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of transactions, privacy and integrity. TMs thus aim to promote the feeling of security and trust of e-consumers9 
thus influencing them to engage in e-commerce10 so that when the e-merchant displays the TM on his website, 
the e-consumers will face only minimal transaction costs (in terms of time invested) to check the integrity of that 
e-merchant in relation to security, privacy and business practice. This is mostly because e-consumers rely on the 
reputation of TMOs11 and on the perception that “a third party gives a written assurance that a product, process, 
or service conforms to specific characteristics”12, with other words they consider TMs a form of guarantee13. 
Some TMs offer mechanisms relating to consumer redress 14 i.e. to resolve disputes between the certified e-
business and the e-consumer. “Such features vary from assistance in filing the case with a consumer redress 
mechanism to providing a complete alternative dispute resolution system”15 
 
Very briefly, the procedure of giving a TM to an e-merchant follows this pattern: the e-merchant cooperates 
with the TMOs and asks for a TM, which he gains when he submits a satisfactory self-assessment report 
referring to the business’s security, privacy and practices16. Different TMs then vary in the degree of scrutiny of 
this self assessment, renewal of application and procedures to withdraw it, again should standards slip. However, 
it is significant to note that a large gap is identified between the online consumers’ actual needs for assurance 
and the assurance that seals are supposed to offer17. 
 
As computer systems changed in nature and became more and more ubiquitous, many technical challenges 
arose that cumulated in the realization that system designers must treat trust and trustworthiness as a need-to-
have design feature, much more prominently than in the currently implemented ones. Prevention of denial of 
service, access control against malicious outsiders and insiders and monitoring, and the achievement of 
scalability are just some of the numerous technical challenges that need to be overcome by current distributed 
systems. The need for such a platform becomes more imperative by the recognition that it is insufficient to rely 
on users taking the necessary precautions to protect their systems themselves (by frequently updating firewalls 
and anti-virus systems) and that the threats and attacks have increased exponentially due to automated attack 
tools, proliferation of vulnerabilities and increased mobility of users18. Instructive in this respect is the CERT 
Coordination Center and its reports on the extremely large amount of vulnerabilities catalogued until 200819. 
 
In addition to the increasing security threats, the easiness to write and spread malicious code (even 
ubiquitously), the vast number of personal computers along with the substantial use and incredible evolution of 
the Internet during the last 15 years20 have led to the conclusion that systems with increased security, high  
                                                          
9
 RICHARD W. HOUSTON & GARY K. TAYLOR, Consumer Perceptions of CPA WebTrustSMAssurances: Evidence of an 
Expectation Gap, 3 International Journal of Auditing (1999);JONATHAN W. PALMER, et al., The Role of Intermediaries in the 
Development of Trust on the WWW: The Use and Prominence of Trusted Third Parties and Privacy Statements, 5 Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication (2000). 
10
 STACY E. KOVAR, et al., Consumer Responses to the CPA WEBTRUST Assurance, 14 Journal of Information Systems 
(2000);ELAINE MAULDIN & VAIRAM ARUNACHALAM, An Experimental Examination of Alternative Forms of Web Assurance 
for Business-to-Consumer e-Commerce, 16 Journal of Information Systems (2002). 
11
 P. BALBONI, Trustmarks: Third-party liability of trustmark organisations in Europe (2008)  
12
 ANDREW RAE, et al., Software Evaluation for Certification   (McGraw-Hill, Inc. . 1994). 
13
 DWANE HAL DEAN & ABHIJIT BISWAS, Third-Party Organization Endorsement of Products: An Advertising Cue Affecting 
Consumer Prepurchase Evaluation of Goods and Services, 30 Journal of Advertising (2001);CARL PACINI & DAVID SINASON, 
Auditor Liability for Electronic Commerce Transaction Assurance: The CPA/CA Webtrust, 36 American Business Law 
Journal (1999). 
14
 CARLETON S. FIORINA, et al., Consumer Confidence Trustmarks (2001);JAN TRZASKOWSKI, Chapter 3 Legislation and 
requirements concerning Trustmarks  (1.0 ed. 2010). 
15
 TRZASKOWSKI. 
16
 ENDESHAW. 
17
 X. R. HU, et al., The effects of Web assurance seals on consumers' initial trust in an online vendor: A functional 
perspective, 48 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (2010);MARCUS D. ODOM, et al., Web Assurance Seals: How and Why 
They Influence Consumers' Decisions, 16 Journal of Information Systems (2002). 
18
 BRIAN BERGER, Trusted computing group history, 10 Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep. (2005). 
19
 CERT, CERT Statistics (Historical), Carnegie Mellon University.(2009), at http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html#vuls. 
20
 INTERNET WORLD STATS, Usage and Population Statistics, Miniwatts Marketing Group(2009), at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
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confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, high-availability and authenticity should be deployed21. Thus the three 
basic conditions that a trusted environment must fulfil are: protected capabilities; integrity measurement; 
integrity reporting, all creating and ensuring platform trust22. Eventually systems covering these aspects will be 
described as trustworthy ones23. 
 
While the legal systems struggle to keep up with technology developments and their enforcement and 
prosecution, the regulation through technology took increasingly center stage24. Rather than prosecuting crime, 
the focus shifted on communicating architectures that make it impossible to commit crimes in the first place, 
regulating by architecture and code rather than law.  
 
One such architecture is Trusted Computing (TC) which has been in the centre of technical, social and legal 
interest over the past few years, aiming to be part of our lives in the near future. TC is a new project by the 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) that targets to allow the computer user to trust his own computer and for 
“others” to trust that specific computer25. In a more explanatory way, as Ross Anderson noted “TC provides a 
computing platform on which you cannot tamper with the application software, and where these applications can 
communicate securely with their authors and with each other”26.  
3. Trusted Computing Technology 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG)27 (formerly known as the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)) 
– a non-profit organization – formed an alliance of promoters like AMD, Hewlett-Packard (HP), IBM, Intel 
Corporation, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems Incorporation and of contributors like Nokia, Fujitsu-Siemens 
Computers, Philips, Vodafone and many more and initiated the Trusted Computing (TC) project. The TCG 
works on the creation of a new computing platform that will provide enhanced trust to the current platform and 
aims to develop, define and promote standards to achieve higher security levels for the Information Technology 
(IT) infrastructure between multiple platforms, devices and networks28.  
 
TCG was formed as a result of the concerns on data exposure on systems, system compromise because of 
software attack and lack of methods to prevent identity theft29. TC is an idea which has evolved from the need to 
address these issues with security solutions that will mitigate the risks and dangers; and help to increase data 
management and identity security. Furthermore, its aim is to protect the software and data in computer platforms 
(servers, desktops, laptops, PDA’s, mobile phones and many more)30 from external attacks and physical theft and 
hopes to improve security for remote access. TC aims to add on computer hardware’s functionality to “enable 
entities with which the computer interacts to have some level of trust in what the system is doing”31. This 
protection is provided by implementing isolated execution environments where software and data will be 
protected from any meddling. Trusted platforms (TP) provide such environments and define the applications that  
 
                                                          
21
 ROLF OPPLIGER & RUEDI RYTZ, Does Trusted Computing Remedy Computer Security Problems?, 3 IEEE Security and 
Privacy (2005). 
22
 M. BURMESTER & J. MULHOLLAND, The advent of trusted computing: implications for digital forensics (ACM Press  2006). 
23
 D. KALLATH, Trust in trusted computing - the end of security as we know it, 2005 Computer Fraud and Security (2005). 
SHIREY. 
24
 LAWRENCE LESSIG, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stanford Law Review (1996). 
25
 LOHMANN VON F., Meditations on Trusted Computing  (2003). 
26
 ROSS ANDERSON, Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / 
TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003)  at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html. 
27
 From 1999 until 2003 TCPA released a number of specifications which mainly focused in enhancing trust and security in 
computing platforms. In early 2001 the first specifications were released, defining the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as the 
fundamental component of a trusted platform. 
28
 BERGER. TCG, Trusted Computing Group. Trusted Computing Group (2010), at http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/. 
29
 BERGER. 
30
 G. PROUDLER, Concepts of trusted computing, in Trusted Computing (C.J. Mitchell ed. 2005). 
31
 CHRIS J. MITCHELL, What is Trusted Computing?, see id. at (Chris J. Mitchell ed. 2008). 
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will be permitted to operate on selected data32. Additionally, TPs can offer assurances about their behaviour both 
in hardware and software33. Here we can indicate for the first time the structural similarity between TC and TM: 
TMs offer assurances to a human consumer that the website he is visiting abides by certain predefined minimal 
standards of security, TC offers assurance to a computer that the system it is going to interact with, performs to 
certain predefined standards of security.  
 
The TCG project is pursuing to allow the computer user to trust his own computer and for “others” to trust 
that specific computer34. 
4. The analogy between TC and TMs - Learning from each other 
“TMs are seen as information on somebody or something to be relied upon by others”35. In fact, the e-consumer 
is motivated from the mark (TM) on the e-merchant’s website to trust that e-merchant and engage in business 
with him. In the case that the collaboration between the e-merchant and the TMOs doesn’t work, the TM system 
has been proved to be weak: there were cases reported where e-consumers’ personal identifying data were kept, 
shared or sold by “certified”-merchants without the data subject’s consent and without the TMO’s knowing36.  
 
We can distinguish cases where a TM was fraudulently obtained and the TM provider did not sufficiently 
scrutinise the information provided in the application, situations where a certificate was once correctly issued, 
but the e-business subsequently lowered its standards and kept the mark on its website even after the violation 
was discovered37, and situations where a website claims to have a TM it was never entitled to. All these can 
cause damage38 to e-consumers39. Thus, it is obvious that the reliance to the trust provided by TMs can be 
treacherous and TMO’s services require a regulatory environment to ensure reliability and accountability40.  
 
In our present study, we aim to provide a comparison between TMOs, and TC in order for both technologies 
to profit from each other. We chose the aforementioned technologies as they lend themselves for obvious 
analogies (see Figure 1) in the sense that TC can provide information (assurances) that a platform is to be 
trusted, so that a third party (i.e. another user’s machine) can rely upon and proceed with successful 
communication and exchange of information. The user of the platform communicates with a verifier who wants 
to assure that the user uses the platform containing the specified TPM. In the same way TMs are seen as 
information that somebody or someone can rely upon by third-parties (e-consumers). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 G. PROUDLER, Concepts of trusted computing, see id. at (C.J. Mitchell ed. 2005). 
33
 EIMEAR GALLERY, Who are the TCG and what are the Trusted Computing concepts?  (2008). 
34
 Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues. (2002). 
35
 BALBONI.   
36
 A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stanford Law Review (2000);J. KORNBLUM, FTC, GeoCities Settle on 
Privacy, CNET News.com 1998. J. MCCARTHY, TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today, Slashdot 1999. 
37
 MCCARTHY. 
38 Damages include violation of e-consumer’s privacy and data protection right to pure economic loss. 
39
 COUNCIL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data  (1995). 
40
 BALBONI,   
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 3 (2012) 
217 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Analogy between TMOs and TC 
 
 
 
The whole TC procedure is automated using one out of the four main features of TC technology, the remote 
attestation. This aims to allow “unauthorized” changes to software to be detected. It remotely traces any changes 
made to any application and allows a third party to decide whether the platform is considered trustworthy41. This 
feature helps to prevent the sending of data to or from a compromised or untrustworthy computer and certifies 
that no unauthorised program installs, updates or modifications are made in the hardware or software on the 
user’s machine. Moreover, “this allows an entity to authenticate the software configuration of a platform that is 
not under its control”42. Here we can see one main difference between TC and TM: If functioning correctly, it is 
nearly impossible to fool the trusted third party that attests the correct working of a platform. This security 
comes at a “cost”: the assurance provider has real time access to the computer whose safe functioning it attests, 
raising concerns about privacy in particular.  
 
We can see more clearly the differences if we compare this approach with SysTrust, a TM approach initiated 
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA). SysTrust, is a service which aims to independently assure business and customers that an 
organisation’s systems are reliable43. SysTrust procedures, in conformity with attestation standards of the 
AICPA, determine the effectiveness of controls that make a system operate reliably. Reliability is determined 
through four criteria: security (from physical or electronic unauthorized access), availability (operational 
readiness and access as agreed), integrity (the system should be complete, accurate, prompt, and authorized in 
processing of information) and confidentiality in terms of information that are kept44.  
 
It has been argued that such TM systems, are more marketing based than quality based, which leads to 
questions on the credibility of the TM system in the long run45. The TM provider has no incentives to probe too 
deeply the credentials of the company it certifies – who might desert him for a less stringent TM provider. Nor 
will it be always feasible to check the submitted data for its correctness – as seen above, the type of features that 
TM attests are much less demanding than the very formal properties assured and certified by TC. Nonetheless, 
the danger of opportunistic behaviour by e-traders, along with unregulated market forces, are forcing TMOs to a 
more untrustworthy practice46 that needs to be altered. 
                                                          
41
 J. REID, GONZALEZ NIETO, J., DAWSON, E., OKAMOTO, E., Privacy and Trusted Computing  § 1529 (IEEE  2003). 
42
 Id. 
43
 Trust Services Principles, Criteria and Illustrations for Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and 
Privacy (Including WebTrust® and SysTrust®) pt. 155 (2006). 
44
 ENDESHAW. 
45
 J.  RIEGELSBERGER & M.A. SASSE, Trust me, I’m a .com. The Problem of Reassuring Shoppers in Electronic Retail 
Environments, 28 Intermedia (2000). 
46
 BALBONI.   
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The critical questions that arise are:  
 
1. what e-consumers can do in order to recover the damage from their reliance on the TM and  
2. the fundamental liability question is whether the TMOs are to be held liable to e-consumers, for their 
damages. 
 
The legal relationship between the two parties (i.e. the TMOs and the e-merchants) of the TM procedure is 
contractual; however, an implied tortious relationship between the TMOs and e-consumers appears as the e-
consumers relied on the certificates that the TMO’s issued (Figure 1). This contractual relationship cannot be 
excluded a priori.  
 
The issue of liability of TMOs hasn’t been given the appropriate attention from courts or governments, but 
there is a beginning of an academic debate on that issue. We argue that the same applies with the issue of 
liability of TC, which although it has been highly controversial amongst the scientific, academic, and legal 
communities, it has not been given the awareness that it deserves and in terms of academic scrutiny is even less 
reflective on the legal implications than the debate on TMOs47. 
 
As stated earlier in this paper, in cases where the e-consumer suffers damages due to his reliance on the TM 
that has been issued on the e-merchant’s website, the consumer can sue the e-merchant for breach of contract or 
in tort for wilful act or breach of their duty of care (negligence liability). However, the easiness with which 
anyone can set up a commercial website selling products or services through the Internet48, decreases the chance 
for an e-consumer to seek vindication against negligent or malicious e-merchants. Therefore, it is easier for the 
e-consumer to locate and sue the TMO for the provision of inaccurate information (TMs) on the e-merchants 
website and also request for compensation. There are TMs that use a redress mechanism that “may also have 
character as a third-party guarantee, where the consumer may seek redress”49. We argue that this integrated 
arbitration that TMs provide, should be adopted by TC. 
 
Balboni50 claims that the TMO third-party legal liability systems are inadequate in Europe and compares 
TMOs with Certification Service providers (CSPs) (i.e. auditors/ accountants and surveyors) which are 
considered TMO’s equivalents, in terms of liability rules and how these apply in analogous cases. Article 6 of 
the Electronic Signatures Directive51 describes third-party liability of CSPs and in England this is incorporated 
into the Electronic Signatures Directive in Section 452. The issue of TMOs third-party liability has been at least 
discussed by Balboni53 and others54 who have analysed liability more closely and made proposal for a model of 
adequate TMO liability55. Their outcomes are described in the following section and with our present study we 
argue that this could be an example of how to deal with the issue of TC’s reliance liability. 
                                                          
47
 YIANNA DANIDOU & BURKHARD SCHAFER, In Law We Trust? Trusted Computing and Legal Responsibility for Internet 
Security, in Emerging Challenges for Security, Privacy and Trust (Dimitris Gritzalis & Javier Lopez eds., 2009). 
48
 For an analysis on the barriers for spotting an e-merchant who has set up a commercial website see BALBONI.   
49
 TRZASKOWSKI. 
50
 BALBONI.   
51
 PAOLO BALBONI, Liability of Certification Service Providers Towards Relying Parties and the Need for a Clear System to 
Enhance the Level of Trust in Electronic Communication, 13 Information & Communications Technology Law 
(2004);EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 
on a Community framework for electronic signatures  § 43 (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EEC  2000). 
52
 THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES REGULATIONS 2002, The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002  (The Stationery Office 
Limited  2002). 
53
 BALBONI. 
54
 ASSAFA ENDESHAW, The Legal Significance of Trustmarks, 10 see id. at (2001). N. P. TERRY, Rating the "Raters": Legal 
Exposure of Trustmark Authorities in the Context of Consumer Health Informatics, 2 Journal of Medical Internet Research 
(2000);PETER T. WENDEL, The Evolution of the Law of Trustee's Powers and Third Party Liability for Participating in a 
Breach of Trust: An Economic Analysis, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 971(2004-2005). 
55
 P. BALBONI, Model for an adequate liability system for Trustmark Organisations, 1 International Journal of Liability and 
Scientific Enquiry (2008). 
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5. The issue of TMOs third-party liability in analogy to TC reliance liability 
 
There is almost no literature on the liability of TMOs that offers direct protection against damages caused by 
reliance on information56. As pointed out by Balboni there seems to be enough ground for improvement in the 
TMOs third-party liability legal issue towards e-consumers57. Civil liability offers protection against damages 
caused by reliance on inaccurate information. As there is no specific regulation covering the TMO third-party 
liability issue, the general principles of civil liability, tort and contract law will be applied.  
 
The issue that arises now is that TMOs usually tend to include specific clauses58 on their contracts in order to 
limit or exclude in some cases, the liability towards e-merchants and e-consumers. And this is where we see a 
paradox: “TMOs are seen as professionals who provide information on their clients, or their clients’ practice, to 
be relied upon by third parties”59 and therefore enhance e-consumer’s trust. It is then highly unlikely that an e-
consumer will trust e-merchant’s security, privacy and business practices if the TMO - that certifies the 
aforementioned - refuses (through those disclaimers) any kind of liability in relation to the certificates.  
 
From this angle, it seems like e-consumers cannot take measures to hold -TMOs liable. In fact, the chances 
that e-consumers have to hold TMOs liable for are very narrow under US and English law60. E-consumers will 
have to invoke either the general principles of tort and contract law or on statutory provisions and case law that 
may be applied in analogy to TMOs. Based on an extensive analysis done by Balboni on US and European legal 
systems concerning third-party liability, most commonly e-consumers will have to provide evidence  
 
a) for the damages they incurred,  
 
b) against the decision of the TMO to issue the TM (i.e. prove that the TMO owes a duty of care towards 
the consumer and that the TMO acted in a way that breached the duty of care) and  
 
c) for the causal link between the TMO’s professional fault and the plaintiff’s occurred damage.  
 
For the last point, it is a prerequisite to prove both ‘foreseeability’61 and ‘proximity’62. However in the 
absence of specific provisions, third-party TMO liability will be based on policy arguments63. It worth to be 
noted that under the 2005 Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices64, TMs can be considered as unfair 
commercial practice if they are not provisional on setting higher standards of consumer protection compared to 
the protection offered by legislation. In fact, it will be a requirement to consider advertising and user of a TM 
with equal levels of consumer protection and legislative requirements, as unfair  
 
 
                                                          
56
 MAURICE SCHELLEKENS & CORIEN PRINS, Unreliable information on the internet: a challenging dilemma for the law, 4 
Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society (2006). 
57
 BALBONI.   
58
 Clauses limiting or excluding the liability of TMOs to e-consumers can be found on the TMO’s website. For a selection of 
the most commonly used clauses that TMOs are using to limit their liability see Ibid. 
59
 BALBONI.   
60
 Id. 
61
 ‘Foreseeability’ determines if the harm caused to the plaintiff, resulting from an action by the defendant was reasonably 
able to be predicted. W.P. KEETON, Prosser and Keeton on Torts   (West Group 5 Sub edition ed. 1984);RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 The Journal of Legal Studies (1989);GREEN 
LEON, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Columbia Law Review (1961).  
62
 The function of proximity is concerned with how one party is placed in regard to the other party. DANUTA  MENDELSON, 
The law of torts Deakin Law Review (1994). 
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commercial practice, under national or community law65. In particular Annex I of the Directive comprises a list 
of commercial practices which are considered unfair.  
 
Turning attention now to TC, it is surprising to see the same legal problem arising in the Trusted Computing 
(TC) legal field66. What happens if due to a malfunction, a non-trustworthy machine is certified as trustworthy, a 
third party engages with it and suffers as a result a loss? In cases such as this, legal systems can and often do 
impose liability outside the contractual nexus, and for the benefit of the third parties that suffered the harm. This 
type of delictual “reliance liability” has been discussed in the context of Certification Service Providers (CSPs) 
(surveyors, accountants, and auditors) which are the TMOs’ offline counterparts and this will ensure that e-
consumers receive at least the same protection online, as the traditional offline. As Balboni67 pointed out in his 
research on the liability issue, it can be easier to deal with it, by applying the set of rules set by Article 6 of the 
Electronic Signatures Directive, which map out fault-based third party liability for CSPs, and postulate CSP’s 
liability towards third-parties who suffer from damages as a result of their reasonable reliance on CSP 
certificates68. In this case, TMOs would be held liable to e-consumers who reasonably rely on the TM and then 
suffer loss from such reliance, for the information included in the TM at the time of issue, even though the TMO 
has not provided evidence of negligence, unless TMOs can prove not to have been negligent. Of course, these 
provisions can offer additional protection to e-consumers assuming that courts will consider them. 
 
A literature survey suggests that while computer scientists seem primarily concerned with the technical 
feasibility of implementing TC, legal academics have tended to concentrate on content control and privacy 
issues69. Neither group appears to be overly concerned with an analysis of the implications of the imposition of 
legal liability for failure within such a system, or potential responsibility for wider social and legal concerns to 
which they may give rise. If greater legal responsibility is placed upon hardware/software providers, this may 
have a significant impact upon the speed and scope of system roll-out, and may leave the system vulnerable to 
threats from market pressures. A new look at the interaction between internet security, trusted computing and 
legal liability has been already proposed70. 
 
A model of adequate third-party liability for TMOs is elaborated based on the principles of CSPs liability 
developing the concept of ‘adequacy’71. Through this concept, liability rules need to protect the e-consumer’s 
expectations when trusting the TMOs, while at the same time, the difficulties that TMOs face because of their 
operation online should be considered72. The liability system needs to improve TMOs practice quality level in 
order to give TMs the ability to extend their potentials and benefits in social, economic and political levels73. The  
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ethical theory of Warranted Trust will protect both TMOs and e-consumers and develops the context in which 
their trust relationship is constructed74, which aims to provide a legal solution to the expectations gap issue. 
 
Similarly, we argue that based on the TMOs third-party liability, the TC reliance liability should be 
structured as statutory regulations that can be potentially applicable by analogy. The same concept of ‘adequacy’ 
which is defined by relating the trust relationship between TMOs and e-consumers should be applied in the trust 
relationship between TC and TC consumers. 
 
Indeed, in many ways TC is the more obvious target of the reliance liability that Balboni discusses than TM. 
The TC philosophy takes the responsibility away from the user entirely and passes it on to the software and 
hardware producers. Imagine if the user wants to verify that a legitimate TMO is behind that TM. The user then 
clicks on a TM, and for his surprise is transferred to a spoofed website, and he realizes that the TMO is not the 
one that claimed to be. An automated system, just like a TC, ought to be able to prevent this from happening, and 
damages for the user to incur. Conversely, we argue that the technologically more ambitious TC approach can 
provide important insights into the user requirements for the next generation of TMs based on the TC philosophy 
and the remote attestation feature. As stated earlier, users cannot be trusted and to the extent that this is possible, 
an automated remote attestation should supplement TMOs.  
 
However, in this new reality, not buying the product stops being an option, if not for legal, then practical 
reasons: unless seen as trustworthy by other machines, the computer will not any longer be able to communicate 
with them, or communicate fully. Where in the non-automatic TMO environment, it is ultimately a decision by 
the customer whether to trust a TM, or to engage with a site without one, in TC that choice will be more and 
more limited by design. With that, legal issues of intervening causality that could be seen as an obstacle to 
reliance liability are removed.  
6. Conclusions 
 
TMOs, unlike TC, rely ultimately on human judgment, and unless backed up by a strong regulatory regime could 
lead to a perception where TMOs are untrustworthy, in contrast with their initial aim, and non accountable. At 
the moment, Europe, as well as US, are arguably inefficient in specific statutory provisions and case law on 
TMO third-party liability which makes things harder – if not impossible – for e-consumers to enforce TMO 
third-party liability in cases they suffer damages from their reasonable reliance on TMs. Therefore, the TM 
system will be questioned and e-consumer’s trust will be lost once more. 
 
More generally, due to the unreliability of some TMOs practices, all players could ultimately be damaged: 
the reputation of the TM program damaged by a run to the bottom, e-merchants will run the risk of housing an 
untrustworthy TM which other e-merchants used and violated, and e-consumer’s trust in e-commerce will 
decrease. Consequently, e-business and e-economies will be hurt and governments which remain reluctant to 
regulate in this matter will allow untrustworthy TMOs spreading out. 
 
In fact, the absence of specific rules on TMO liability creates a legal ‘immunity’ for TMOs, which is 
unacceptable. As Balboni75 proposed, floodgates arguments which are widely used to limit third-party liability, 
should be taken into consideration. As a solution, he proposed that TMOs could reasonably limit their liability as 
it happens, following the example of the CSP’s liability provision set in Article 6 of the Electronic signatures 
directive76 and European governments should sooner or later act on this issue before it is too late. 
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This paper argues that TM can learn about the advantages of introducing a degree of automatisation, into this 
process, and into other inspection and TM qualifying activities, and in the general outline of an infrastructure 
similar to TC. Additionally, we argue that based on the TMOs third-party liability, the TC reliance liability 
should be structured using the same concept of ‘adequacy’ which is defined by relating the trust relationship 
between TMOs and e-consumers and should be applied in the trust relationship between TC and TC consumers. 
Lastly, TC is, in our view, an even better candidate for reliance liability than TMOs, as the more automation is 
adopted by TMOs, the stronger is their case becoming for reliance liability.  
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